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Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Forced Marriage at the
International Criminal Court: How Katanga
Utilizes a Ten-Year-Old Rule but Overlooks New
Jurisprudence
Elena Gekker*
“My body was affected. My God, I was very ashamed. Now I have
become useless. That is something that I do not believe anyone could be
subjected to in life, that is to totally destroy someone’s body. You become
totally useless. You no longer have any value. When somebody sees you,
they do not value you any longer, and they look down on you.” [Testimony
of Witness 1321]

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 2003, the village of Bogoro in the Ituri province of
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was startled awake by heavy
gunfire.2 The Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and the Front for
Patriotic Resistance of Ituri (FRPI) soldiers were attacking the Union of
Congolese Patriots (UPC) militia in control of the Hema-dominated
village.3 The attack was aimed at driving the UPC from Bogoro, a
strategically important town between Bunia, the district capital, and the
border with Uganda.4 FNI and FRPI soldiers, often children under the age

* Editor-in-Chief, 2013-2014; J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law; B.A., Political Science and History, Notre Dame de Namur University,
2011. I would like to thank Professor Susana SáCouto and the Summer Law Program in
The Hague at American University, Washington College of Law for introducing me firsthand to this difficult but fascinating topic and Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza at UC
Hastings for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process. A special thank you to
my family, friends, and Steve Spagnuolo for their continued and unconditional support.
1. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card on International
Criminal Court 2010, 175 (Nov. 2010) http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/GRC10-WEB11-10-v4_Final-version-Dec.pdf [hereinafter Gender Report Card 2010].
2. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07, Transcript of Record, 21 (Apr. 19, 2010), ICC-01/04-01/07-T-129-Red-ENG; Gender
Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160.
3. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160.
4. U.N. Secretary-General, Special Report on the Events in Ituri, January 2002December 2003, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. S/2004/573 (July 16, 2004) available at http://allafrica.
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of fifteen, circled the village, armed with machetes, spears, arrows, rocketpropelled grenades, rocket launchers and semiautomatic weapons.5 At least
200 civilians were killed in a matter of hours, and the village looted, while
survivors were imprisoned in rooms filled with corpses, and women and
girls were gang-raped, mutilated, and sexually enslaved.6 The United
Nations (U.N.) estimated that 173 of the over 200 victims were under the
age of eighteen.7 Two men are alleged to have stood at the helm of this
massacre—Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,8 respective
leaders of the FRPI and FNI.9
What sets this incident apart from other similar atrocities committed
over the last fifty years in various parts of the world? The alleged
perpetrators of these crimes have been forced to face the charges brought
against them in an international court of law.10 Katanga and Ngudjolo were
initially jointly accused of three crimes against humanity (murder, sexual
slavery, and rape) and seven war crimes (using children under the age of
fifteen to take an active part in hostilities; deliberately directing an attack
on a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking
part in hostilities; willful killing; destruction of property; pillaging; sexual
slavery and rape).11 However, even though there was sufficient evidence
and known instances, forced marriage was not charged due to lack of
international jurisprudence and independent recognition of forced marriage
as a crime against humanity.12 This is the second International Criminal
Court (ICC) trial and the first trial at the Court to include charges for
gender-based crimes.13 While this is certainly not the first instance of
com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010308:0f169b3a522a70b9d8d609a898b7041e
.pdf.
5. Press Release, U.N. News Centre, Congolese war crimes suspect turned over to
International Criminal Court (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.
asp?nid=24325.
6. Id.
7. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 4, ¶ 65.
8. On December 18, 2012, the ICC’s Trial Chamber II acquitted Ngudjolo. See infra
V.B.2.
9. Id.; Open Society Justice Initiative, The Trial of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Dec. 2012),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ngudjolo-judgment-brief-2012121
7.pdf.
10. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Opening of the trial in the case of
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui on 24 November, 2009 (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20
releases%20(2009)/Pages/pr477.aspx.
11. Id.
12. See generally Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 161, 165, 171, 174.
13. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 160. This is the second trial at the Court
arising out of the DRC Situation. The first was that of UPC leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
(“Lubanga”), who was charged with enlisting child soldiers under the age of to take active
part in hostilities. He was the first-ever accused to be convicted by the ICC since its
inception in 2002 and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. Although Lubanga was
only charged with one crime, there was a strong push by the Legal Representative for
Victims to include a charge for gender-based offenses mid-trial but Office of the Prosecutor
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gender-based crimes committed in the context of either an international or
non-international armed conflict prosecuted by an international tribunal, the
significance of this decision rests in the precedent it sets for future
prosecution of similar crimes at the first-ever permanent international
criminal court.14 The lack of attention paid to prosecuting the crime of
forced marriage may be indicative of the Court’s reluctance to address a
pressing issue due to a lack of consensus and precedent.
This Note will examine the history of international prosecution of
sexually-based crimes, discuss the precedents15 set by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Akayesu, Furundžija, and
Kunarac, and why these decisions have become the legal standard for
prosecution and conviction of sexual violence crimes in the ICC. It will
address the development and establishment of ICTY rules, such as the
narrow definition of rape as set forth in Furundžija and the inclusion of
sexual enslavement as a crime under slavery, which has long been
recognized for its peremptory status, in Kunarac, and why these particular
rules are necessary for the effective functioning of the ICC. This Note will
maintain that the codification of the ICTY and ICTR rules under the ICC’s
Elements of Crimes was, and continues to be, necessary to promote the
standardization of prosecution of sexual violence crimes, to provide the
victims of these atrocities with tangible results and faith in the international
legal system, and to continue on the path of establishing rape and sexual
violence as distinct norms of jus cogens. Specifically, it will apply the
Elements of Crimes to the sexually based crimes committed in Bogoro on
February 23, 2003, and that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC under
Article 7(1)(g) and Article 8(2)(b)(xxii), and conclude that Katanga should
be found guilty of his alleged crimes. This Note will also discuss the crime
of forced marriage and its recent recognition as an independent crime
against humanity by the Special Courts of Sierra Leone (SCSL). It will
chose not to do so. For in-depth discussion of the Lubanga trial and failure to bring forth
additional charges see Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 129; see also K’Shaani O.
Smith, Note, Prosecutor v. Lubanga: How the International Criminal Court Failed the
Women and Girls of the Congo, 54 HOW. L.J. 467 (2011).
14. See generally James R. McHenry III, Note, The Prosecution of Rape Under
International Law: Justice That Is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1269 (2002)
(discussing the history of sexual violence prosecution and the ICTY decision in Prosecutor
v. Kunarac where enslavement was broadened to include sexual enslavement as a crime
against humanity) [hereinafter The Prosecution of Rape]. See also Alex Obote-Odora, Rape
and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 135 (2005) (discussing the first-ever conviction for rape and sexual violence by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu).
15. Here, and in the remainder of this note, the word “precedent” is used not within its
normal context of a binding decision. I use “precedent” to only mean a prior ruling on a
similar legal issue. The Rome Statute does not provide for a concept of binding precedent
as is customary in U.S. law but, instead, sets out a hierarchy of rules and law for the ICC to
apply when deciding a particular case. See infra V.
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discuss the two cases that defined the crime of forced marriage and went on
to apply the definition but it will also discuss the difficulty in
differentiating between the elements of sexual slavery and forced marriage
and in applying them. This Note will recommend that forced marriage
should be recognized as a particular crime of sexual slavery due to its
inherent sexual nature and conclude with the observation that the law will
likely continue in recognizing and narrowing the definitions of various
sexual violence crimes, and rape and sexual violence crimes will likely be
recognized as separate jus cogens norms, in order to vindicate and
internationally recognize the victims’ suffering.
Part II of this Note will discuss international criminal law prior to the
formation of the ad hoc tribunals and the prosecution of sexual violence
crimes that occurred in that time. Part III will address the events leading up
to the necessity for and the emergence of the two notable ad hoc tribunals,
the ICTY and the ICTR. It will also discuss the history of the Rwandan
conflict and the landmark Akayesu decision that first promulgated a
uniform definition of rape in international criminal law. Part IV will
discuss the ICTY, the history of the Balkan conflict, the ICTY’s
jurisdiction over sexual violence crimes and two important sexual violence
cases, Furundžija and Kunarac. Therein will also discuss the two crucial
rules arising out of the ICTY, a narrower definition of rape and the
inclusion of sexual enslavement under the peremptory norm of slavery.
Part V will discuss the establishment of the International Criminal Court as
the first permanent court dealing with grave prosecutions of criminal law
and its limited jurisdiction, both in terms of complementarity and
precedent. Part V will also discuss the Katanga and Ngudjolo cases in
greater detail and the ICC’s jurisdiction over sexual violence crimes. Part
VI will apply the Elements of Crimes of rape and sexual slavery to the
pending Katanga case and endorse that the Court find Katanga guilty of the
crimes allegedly committed at Bogoro. Part VII will discuss the relative
newness of defining and prosecuting forced marriage at the SCSL, the two
leading cases that have defined forced marriage and applied the definition,
and will recommend that the ICC should adopt forced marriage as a
particular crime under sexual slavery as opposed to enumerating it as a
“new” crime of humanity due to the inherent difficulty in separating the
sexual nature of the crime from the persecutor’s intent to form true marital
relations. Part VIII will conclude by addressing that the rules established
by the ICTY and ICTR have achieved the status of well-recognized
principles of international criminal law, and in fact have been codified in
Elements of Crimes, and the crime of forced marriage should be subjected
to the same treatment due to the need for a standardized prosecutorial
scheme, recognition of victims rights and experiences, and promulgation of
the need for rape and sexual violence to become recognized norms of jus
cogens.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES PRIOR TO THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS
International prosecution prior to World War II is both sparse and farreaching, generally owing its roots to the “extensive development of the
international law of war crimes.”16 The movement for prosecution of war
crimes committed during World War I, and specifically of the Armenian
genocide committed by the Ottoman Turks, had support among the
Russian, French, and British forces, not solely to prosecute the offenders on
an individual basis, but instead, as more of a political statement of
condemnation.17 The Allied Governments also established a Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties where the nonexhaustive list of thirty-two categories of violations
included, finally, sexual violence crimes.18 The Commission was likely
influenced by, and attempted to apply, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, which established a very basic foundation for the prosecution of later
violations of the laws of humanity.19 However, any real progress and
further actions were thwarted by in-house bickering and power struggle in
the postwar environment.20
International criminal law, as we know it today, has predominantly
derived from the prosecutions at the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crimes
trials. The phrase “crimes against humanity” was first used by the Allied
prosecutors in the Nuremburg Trials, which was defined by the charter
establishing the International Military Tribunal.21 The charter, however,
did not encompass sexual violence crimes.22
A great step for prosecution of sexual violence crimes came in 1949
with the conclusion of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, which entered into force on October 21,
1950.23 The Convention, for the first time ever, asserts that “[w]omen shall
be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
16. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the
Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 682 (1997). See supra
for an in-depth discussion of development of international law and the post-WWII
prosecution of violations.
17. A joint Declaration to the Ottoman Empire was issued in May 1915 “hold[ing]
personally responsible for these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those
of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” Id. at 700.
18. Id. at 701.
19. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1276.
20. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1276.
21. James McHenry, Casenote, Justice for Foca: The International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia’s Prosecution of Rape and Enslavement as Crimes Against Humanity, 10 TULSA
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 183, 188 (2002) [hereinafter Justice for Foca].
22. Id.
23. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Oct. 21, 1950, 75 UNTS 287, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3
6d2.html.
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against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”24 This
sentence single-handedly established rape in particular, and sexual assault
through later interpretation, as a crime under international criminal law, as
both the ICTR and ICTY rely on various articles of the Convention for
prosecutorial jurisdiction.25

III. EMERGENCE OF THE AD HOCS
The atrocities of the late twentieth century led to the revolutionary
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals (ad hocs), most notably the ICTR and
ICTY in 1994 and 1993, respectively. I will discuss the establishment of
ICTY and its jurisprudence in detail infra IV. In both cases, the Tribunals
were established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter providing for the handling of “any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”26 The Security
Council gave both Tribunals the binding authority to prosecute individuals
accused of committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity, “and also authorized that the act of rape could fall under the
aegis of any of these violations and crimes.”27
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana
was shot down.28 In a country already deeply divided along ethnic lines—
majority Hutu, minority Tutsi—the death of a Hutu president resulted in
immediate violence.29 The Hutu resentment of the Tutsi because of the
Belgian historical preference eventually led to a series of riots in 1959
when more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed and many more sought refuge in
neighboring countries.30 When the Belgians granted Rwanda independence
in 1962, the Hutus secured power.31 During the three months following the
assassination of Habyarimana, over 800,000 Rwandan men, women, and
children were massacred.32 The Hutu were encouraged by the presidential

24. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 23, art. 27.
25. See S.C. Res. 955, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993).
26. U.N. Charter art. 39.
27. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1279.
28. Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Council, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/
genocide/genocidein_rwanda.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
29. Id.
30. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.
stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
31. Id.
32. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 139.
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guard and radio propaganda to murder, mutilate, and loot their Tutsi and
moderate Hutu neighbors.33 More significantly, Tutsi women were raped
and sexually violated with the centralized aim at wiping out the entire Tutsi
population of Rwanda. Statistical projections estimate that between
250,000 to 500,000 women were raped based on the number of pregnancies
that coincided with the three months of the genocide.34 However, it is
highly likely that these numbers fail to take into account the women who
were, for any reason, unable to conceive or those who experience multiple
rapes or gang rapes, and therefore do not represent the total amount.35
These numbers also fail to take into account the women who were
mutilated, raped by foreign objects, those who self-aborted or committed
infanticide, and those who were murdered after they were raped.36 In short,
“rape was the rule and its absence the exception.”37
In response to the atrocious acts of violence committed in Rwanda, the
United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 with a mandate to prosecute rape and
sexual violence alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.38
Since its inception, the ICTR has developed extensive
jurisprudence on prosecution of rape and violence including finding that
rape and sexual violence were major components of the Rwanda Crisis and
that they were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack
against a targeted group.39 However, the ICTR’s greatest contribution to
successful prosecution of sexual violence is the decision in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu.
B. THE FIRST STEP: AKAYESU
Jean Paul Akayesu, the bourgermester (mayor) of Taba commune in
Rwanda, was charged with fifteen counts including rape and sexual
violence as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.40 Even
though Akayesu has been hailed as a revolutionary moment in the field of
sexual violence prosecution, surprisingly, the initial indictment did not

33. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 139–40; BBC, supra note 30.
34. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.
35. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.
36. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.
37. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.
38. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 141.
39. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 144. Classification of “widespread and systematic
attack against a targeted group” is necessary as part of the elements establishing crimes
against humanity. International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute].
40. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-I, Indictment (Jan. 1, 1996),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/actamond.pdf.
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include charges of sexual violence.41 In fact, it was only after the
testimony of Witness J, who testified that her six-year-old daughter had
been “raped by three Interahamwe [Hutu extremists] when they came to
kill her father,” that the Tribunal recommended for the prosecutor to
initiate further investigation into the situation.42
The Trial Chamber delivered its judgment on September 2, 1998,
where it finally provided an internationally accepted definition for rape,
defining it as “a physical invasion of sexual nature, committed on a person
under circumstances which are coercive.”43 The Trial Chamber also went
on further to define sexual violence as “any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstance which are coercive. Sexual
violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”44
Finally, the case did not allege that Jean Paul Akayesu physically engaged
in the rape and sexual violence but that he ordered, instigated, or otherwise
facilitated the acts by his words of encouragement, his presence, and his
failure to prevent, stop, or punish his subordinates.45 The Chamber
convicted Akayesu “by virtue of his authority,” of individual criminal
responsibility for rape and sexual violence.46

IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
was created in May 1993 by the U.N. Security Council to prosecute the war
criminals responsible for the ethnic cleansing campaigns in the former
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and 1990s.47 Yugoslavia’s inception postWorld War II inevitably arranged for the resulting ethnic conflicts when
41. Samantha I. Ryan, Comment, From the Furies of Nanking to the Eumenides of the
International Criminal Court; The Evolution of Sexual Assaults as International Crimes, 11
PACE INT’L L. REV. 447, 469 (1999).
42. Id.
43. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf.
44. Id. The Trial Chamber cited testimony of Witness KK who described Akayesu
ordering the undressing of a student in a public courtyard and forcing her to do gymnastics
as an example of forced nudity constituting sexual violence. The judgment stated that
coercion need not be physical and that it may be inherent in armed conflicts or when
military is present. The Trial Chamber also broadened the definition of rape to include acts
involving the insertion of foreign objects and “the use of bodily orifices not considered to be
intrinsically sexual.” Id. ¶ 686. This is significant because it recognizes the reason behind
raping and sexual violence committed during an armed conflict with genocidal intent—to
demean and humiliate the “other.” See also Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 149 (noting the
special importance of recognizing rape as only a part of destruction and the subsequent
psychological damage).
45. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 692-94.
46. Obote-Odora, supra note 14, at 150.
47. Andrea R. Phelps, Note, Gender-Based War Crimes: Incidence and Effectiveness of
International Criminal Prosecution, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 499, 504 (2006).
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Dictator Josip Tito unified the six republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro into one communist
country.48 After Tito’s death in 1980 and just prior to the fall of the Soviet
Union, Slobodan Milošević emerged out of the power vacuum as the leader
of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986 on a platform of Serbian
independence.49
Croatia and Slovenia held elections and declared
independence in 1991, closely followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992,
leading to an even greater drift between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats
dominating the region.50 The ethnic groups within the now-independent
countries turned on each other and sought alliances with their brethren in
neighboring countries, engulfing the entire region in an ethnically fueled
armed conflict. The Bosnian Serbs initiated attacks against the Croats and
Muslims of Bosnia and subjected them to military attacks, interrogation,
and torture.51 Sexual crimes52 were among the most prevalent and included
rape, forced sterilization, forced pregnancy and childbirth, sexual slavery,
and other sexual violence offenses.53 ICTY estimates that from 1992 to
1995, between 20,000 and 50,000 mostly Bosniak woman and girls were
raped.54 “Rape was an official policy of war” and the perpetrators were
limited only by their imagination.55
A. SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES IN ICTY STATUTE
ICTY Statute Articles 2 through 5 provide for the Tribunals jurisdiction
in prosecuting “serious violations of international humanitarian law

48. CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL,
What Happened to Yugoslavia? 3 (2004) http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/teachingresource
s/balkan-crisis.pdf.
49. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505.
50. CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, supra note 48, at 5–6.
51. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505.
52. Most legal commentary hails the ad hocs with revolutionizing the prosecution of
sexual violence in the context of female victims and overlooks sexual violence targeting
male victims. ICTY’s first case, and the first international war crimes trial since Nuremburg
and Tokyo, was also the first-ever trial for sexual violence against men. After a three-year
trial, the Trial Chamber handed down a guilty verdict. See Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7,
1997). See Dagmar Herzog, Sexual Violence against Men: Torture at Flossenbürg, in
RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 29 (Carol Rittner & John K. Roth eds., 2012), for an
academic discussion of sexual violence against men in the context of conflicts, and
specifically in the Nazi concentration camps, for scientific, genocidal, and personal
purposes.
53. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505; Crimes of Sexual Violence, ICTY, http://www.
icty.org/sid/10312 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
54. Christina M. Morus, War Rape and the Global Condition of Womanhood: Learning
from the Bosnian War, in RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 45, 47 (Carol Rittner &
John K. Roth eds., 2012).
55. Phelps, supra note 47, at 505 (internal quotations omitted).
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committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”56 While
only Article 5, “Crimes Against Humanity,” provides for rape as a specific
crime, both Articles 3, “Violations of the Laws or Customs of War,” and 4,
“Genocide,” have been interpreted to cover sexual violence offenses. The
Appeal Chamber in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision interpreted Article 3 as
having “a very broad scope” and covering “any serious violation of a rule
of customary international humanitarian law entailing, under international
customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the
person breaching the rule.”57 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber in the
Furundžija Judgment concurred with the ICTR Akayesu decision
categorizing rape as a crime of genocide, where the other elements are
present as well.58
B. DEFINING MOMENTS: FURUNDŽIJA AND KUNARAC
In April 1993, Anto Furundžija served as a local commander of a
special unit of Croatian forces known as the “Jokers.”59 His team was
tasked with interrogating two witnesses, Witness A (a Muslim woman) and
Witness D (a Croatian soldier).60 By the time Furundžija and his team were
through with Witness A, she had been subject to multiple rapes, sexual
assaults, and physical abuse.61 Ultimately, the Tribunal found Furundžija
guilty of violation of the laws or customs of war, torture and outrages upon
personal dignity, including rape.62 However, the Judgment’s most crucial
component was its narrow definition of rape under international law,
wherein the elements of rape were defined as: “(1) sexual penetration,
however slight, of the vagina, anus, or mouth of the victim by the penis or
the vagina or anus of the victim by an object used by the perpetrator, and 2)
by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third party.”63
In a 1996 indictment, the ICTY named Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir
Kuvač, and Zoran Vuković, in addition to several other codefendants, in an

56. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute
_sept09_en.pdf.
57. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
58. Id. ¶ 172.
59. Chad G. Marzen, The Furundžija Judgment and Its Continued Vitality in
International Law, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 505, 507 (2010).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 508. In addition to being present and overseeing the interrogation, Furundžija
also directly took part in the interrogation of Witness A. While he questioned the woman,
another soldier “rubbed his knife against Witness A’s inner thigh and lower stomach and
threatened to put his knife inside Witness A’s vagina should she not tell the truth.” Witness
A was also forced to perform oral sex, raped on numerous occasions, and eventually
collapsed of exhaustion. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 38.
62. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, part IX.
63. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 185.
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indictment stemming from actions occurring in Foca in 1992.64 All three
were charged with rape, in addition to other individual offenses.65 The
incident took place during and after a Bosnian Serb takeover of the town,
after which all the Croats and Muslims were rounded up, separated, and
imprisoned in various detention facilities.66 All three were accused of
personally partaking in raping and sexually assaulting Muslim women and
girls.67 On February 22, 2001, the Trial Chamber announced its conviction
of all three men of both war crimes and crimes against humanity.68 It is
important to note that the Chamber also ruled that the rapes in Foca
constituted an outrage upon personal dignity under Article 3(c) of the
Geneva Conventions, even though the Conventions do not explicitly hold
jurisdiction over rape crimes.69 The Chamber believed that the crimes
committed at Foca were of such a grave nature that they could constitute a
war crime as contemplated by the Conventions’ drafters.70 Furthermore,
the Chamber relied on an extensive history of enslavement as part of
international human rights and humanitarian law in finding that a particular
type of enslavement (i.e., sexual enslavement) constituted a crime against
humanity.71
Akayesu, Furundžija, and Kunarac established solid rules pertaining to
recognition and prosecution of sexual violence crimes by frankly
acknowledging sexual violence crimes as significant components of
international and non-international armed conflicts and by defining the
exact nature of the crimes. These established rules have never been
disputed or overruled by any international judicial or legislative body and,
in fact, have been used in finding crimes of genocide and torture, wellestablished peremptory norms.72 The broad definition of rape and sexual
violence in Akayesu was fitting considering this was the first occasion that
an international tribunal of this sort considered specifically proven
instances of rape and sexual violence. The particular nature of the conflict
as well supported a more inclusive definition—the deplorable nature of the
conflict and the extremely short amount of time it took (100 days) may
have prompted the ICTR judges to err on the side of over inclusivity. The
ICTY took the opportunity to polish and narrow in scope the definition of
rape in Furundžija while still revolutionizing prosecution of sexual
64. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283.
65. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283.
66. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283.
67. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1284.
68. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1283.
69. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1285.
70. The Prosecution of Rape, supra note 14, at 1285.
71. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 542 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222
e.pdf.
72. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of
Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 287, 295 (2002).
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violence crimes by recognizing that coercion can exist whether directed
toward the victim or toward third parties and specifically acknowledging
oral sexual acts as rape.73 While some may see the narrowing of the
definition of rape as negative, it in fact makes the definition more explicit,
which simplifies the process of establishing a uniform definition for
international bodies, an undoubtedly positive development if the goal is to
standardize the prosecution of sexual violence crimes.74 Crucially, the
ICTY also demonstrated the fluid and ever-evolving nature of international
criminal law where peremptory norms are still subject to novel
interpretation when it explicitly included sexual enslavement as an
accepted form of slavery in Kunarac.75 It is undisputed that in adopting
these particular rules in its Elements of Crimes,76 the ICC relied on wellestablished international law arising out of real, fact-based situations and
any further application of these principles will ground them as customary
international law and peremptory norms.

V. PERMANENT SOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT77
ICTY and ICTR are generally the best known of the ad hoc tribunals
established by the United Nations. However, it would be wrong to assume
that prosecution of the world’s atrocities has stopped there. The United
Nations have also subsequently established the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,78

73. Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L. L. 225, 231 (2006-2007).
74. Id. It also reflects the narrower definition of rape generally accepted within various
national law systems, like the U.S. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (stating, in
pertinent part, that “rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished . . . where the person
is incapable . . . of giving legal consent . . . [and] where it is accomplished against a person’s
will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the person or another.”).
75. Sellers, supra note 72, at 296.
76. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 2 (2011) available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/
ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf. Throughout this note, I will refer to the International Criminal
Court Elements of Crimes as “Elements of Crimes.”
77. It is worth noting that neither the ICC nor the ad hoc tribunals are the first
international court established by the United Nations. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal
international judicial organ. However, the ICJ is a civil court tasked with resolving legal
disputes submitted by the Member States and issuing advisory opinions on legal questions
referred to it by the United Nations. See generally International Court of Justice,
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
78. The Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia are distinguishable from the ICTY and ICTR since they are not seated in The
Hague, Netherlands, as most others tribunals are and they place a greater emphasis on
prosecution of crimes under both international humanitarian law and national law. See
generally Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013);
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and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon79 amongst numerous ideas for
others.80 The international community finally realized that crimes based on
preconceived notions and cultural differences would unfortunately continue
to occur and establishing isolated, individual tribunals ex post facto with
limited jurisdiction is simply unfeasible. Thus, in 1995, the United Nations
established an ad hoc committee pursuant to the recommendation of the
International Law Commission to establish an international criminal court,
and agreed to convene in Rome, Italy, during the summer of 1998.81 The
result of that convention was a multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute of the
International Court, which, if ratified by sixty countries, would establish
the International Criminal Court (ICC).82 As of May 1, 2013, 122 countries
are considered Member States to the ICC.83 Importantly, the ICC only has
complementary jurisdiction over its Member States and is often described
as the “court of last resort” as it will not act if a case is already being
investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless the State is
unable or unwilling to genuinely prosecute.84 It is also important to note
the limitation of ratione temporis—”the Court has jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of [the Rome]
Statute” or “[i]f a State [became] a Party to [the Rome] Statute after its
entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of [the Rome] Statute for that
State,” unless the State voluntarily accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.85

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
79. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, although seated in The Hague, is further unique in
that its jurisdiction is limited to Lebanese criminal code; it prosecutes terrorism as a distinct
crime; it allows full participation by victims in the trial; it also allows trials in absentia; and
it has created a separate Defence Office as an equal counterpart to the Office of the
Prosecutor. See Unique Features, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, http://www.stl-tsl.org/
en/about-the-stl/unique-features (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
80. See International Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/law (last visited Oct.
1, 2013).
81. G.A. Res. 49/53, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/53 (Feb. 17, 1995); Cheryl K. Moralez,
Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal: Will It Work?, 4 DEPAUL INT’L L.J. 135,
140 (2000).
82. Rosaria Vigorito, The Evolution and Establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), 30 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 92, 93 (2002). One hundred twenty countries voted in
favor and seven voted against (including the United States) with twenty-one abstentions.
Interestingly, while the United States did sign the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, it
has yet to ratify it.
83. ICC at a glance, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus
/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/icc%20at%20a%20glance.aspx
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013). The United States is not one of the 122 Member States.
84. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 17(1)(a).
85. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 11.
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A. ROME STATUTE AND JURISDICTION OVER SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES
An important aspect of the Rome Statute and a peculiarity of the ICC,
and international law in general, is the lack of binding legal precedent.
Article 21 provides for the hierarchy of law and legal principles that the
Court may apply in handing down its decisions and, specifically, that “[t]he
Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions,” but it does not have to.86 This presents a significant legal
challenge in the equal application of the law, as it is quite feasible for two
different Trial Chambers, presiding over different cases with similar legal
questions, to issue two separate and conflicting judgments. Furthermore,
the Court may also apply, after relying on “[the Rome] Statute, Elements of
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, . . . applicable treaties and
the principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict.”87 This language
allows the ICC to consider judgments of the other ad hocs on factually
similar cases, as many have been recognized to be “established principles,”
but, as noted, does not mandate the Court to do so. These considerations
potentially present a challenge in specific areas of law that have yet to be
clearly established and thoroughly analyzed by international tribunals and
reflects the new-ness and constant evolution of the international criminal
law. However, in the limited area of scope addressed in this Note—rape,
sexual slavery, and sexual violence—the Court has chosen to rely on the
findings of other notable ad hocs and codify “much of what was first
articulated [and prosecuted] in the ICTY and ICTR, but not enumerated as
a crime in their respective Statutes.”88 A notable exception to this
absorbing of the law is the crime of forced marriage, discussed infra VII.
The Rome Statute, similar to the statutes of ICTY and ICTR, provides
for the Court’s jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole,” and specifically: the crimes of
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of
aggression.89 Jurisdiction over crimes of sexual nature can be found within
crimes against humanity (“rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity”)90 and war crimes (“rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy . . . enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions”).91

86. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 21(2) (emphasis added).
87. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 21(1)(a-b).
88. Ellis, supra note 73, at 238.
89. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 5.
90. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g).
91. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii). For the purposes of this Note, the
discussion of the required circumstances for an international or a non-international conflict
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A crucial aspect of the ICC and its jurisdiction over sexual violence
crimes is its uniformity. As mentioned previously in this Note, ICC and its
jurisdiction arose out of a recognized need for a consistent definition of
rape and sexual violence and manner of prosecution. That has been
combined with the need for a competent international judicial organ that
would oversee the prosecution of well-established international crimes of
uniform definition, which was foreseen by the U.N. in the post-WWII
world.92 The Rome Statue itself recognizes that need and the danger of
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole [going] unpunished.”93 The ICC and its Elements were the answer.
As the world conceded its inability to continue responding to crises on a
case-by-case basis and circled back to the initial discussion of a unified,
international, controlling judicial organ it was only logical to adopt the
legal precedents already established by ad hocs created by the United
Nations for the sole purpose of deciding these very issues. Even those
criticizing a unified international criminal court, boasting about its
downfalls and oversights, and instead proposing a system of regional
enforcement of international law, admit that “[e]ven a slight variation in
substantive rules of international criminal law could prove extremely
damaging.”94 Lacking a consensus, the universal international crimes
would lose their universality, perpetrators and judges could have their
choice of applicable law, and “the legitimacy of international criminal law
could be fundamentally threatened.”95 And while it is true that the various
ad hocs and regional tribunals have for the most part adhered to the rules
and standards set out by their counterparts, a universal, singular
international criminal court codifying those rules as the only valid
interpretation of international law significantly elevates the validity of the
new law.
It is also worth noting that the ICC and codification of the definition of
rape in the Elements of Crimes, aside from promoting a uniform
application of law of use to international tribunals, judges, attorneys, and
perpetrators, also provides a uniform method of relief for the victims. In a
world where rape is still often seen as the fault of the woman-victim, where
even the victims continually blame themselves, “saying ‘I was in the wrong
place, I should have fought harder, I should have . . . ,’” a written and
consistent law that acknowledges the helplessness and vulnerability of the
situation the victim is placed in and that definitively demonstrates that the
has been omitted. When deciding a case before any of the ad hocs or the ICC, the court
would first establish the nature of the conflict to determine whether the court possesses
jurisdiction.
92. G.A. Res. 260 (III) B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Jan. 1, 1948).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 39, Preamble.
94. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INTL. L. J. 729, 756 (2003).
95. Id. at 757.
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perpetrator will be prosecuted for his crimes, is of greater importance than
even to the international prosecutorial system.96 The ICC has been
revolutionary in recognizing the victims’ suffering and allowing them great
participation in all stages of the prosecutorial process.97 In fact, the “victim
standing rule” has been codified in the Rome Statute stating, “[w]here the
personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their
views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court.”98 The ICC allows
victims to have legal representatives to assist them in the process and to
participate in the trial on their behalf;99 establishes various protective
measures during the testimonial and investigative process “to protect the
safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of
victims and witnesses;”100 and provides for reparations for victims.101
These provisions and safeguards are new developments in the area of
international criminal law and help create “a court where the victims are
more than mere witnesses,” and provide a forum for victims’ experiences
to be vindicated while also bringing about justice.102
By codifying the decisions handed down in ICTY and ICTR in its
Elements of Crimes, the ICC also promoted the inclusion of rape and
sexual violence as a norm of jus cogens. The jus cogens doctrine defines
peremptory norms from which derogation is not allowed.103 It essentially
identifies those principles that override others based on certain values and
interests.104 Article 53 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines jus cogens:
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international

96. Terese Godwin Phelps, Feminist Legal Theory in the Context of International
Conflict, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 173, 178 (2009).
97. At least in comparison with the extent of victim participation in the U.S. “The rule
stems from the continental European legal systems, which grant victims extensive rights and
limit the government prosecutor’s ability to control a criminal case.” Smith, supra note 13,
at 494.
98. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 68 § 3.
99. International Criminal Court, Rules of Evidence and Procedure, III §3 Rule 90–91
(2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/
official%20journal/Documents/RPE.4th.NG.08Feb1200.pdf [hereinafter Rules of Evidence
and Procedure].
100. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 68 § 1; Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra
note 99, III §2 Rule 87–88.
101. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 75; Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note
99, III §4.
102. Phelps, supra note 47, at 517.
103. David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a
Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 228
(2005).
104. Id.
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law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”105
Jus cogens norms generally develop over time with the consensus of
the international community and, over the decades of legal development,
have come to include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
torture, aggression, piracy, and slavery as accepted peremptory norms.106
In the ICTY and ICTR cases discussed above, the ad hocs interpreted rape
and sexual violence as evidence of acts satisfying elements of genocide
(Akayesu), torture (Furundžija), and slavery (Kunarac).107 Unfortunately,
the interpretation that rape may constitute conduct sufficient to prove
elements of other peremptory norms but does not rise on its own rids sexual
violence of the independent recognition it deserves.108 To achieve the
status of a peremptory norm, an international rule has to satisfy the basic
sources of international law including treaty, custom, and general principles
in addition to other objective indicia promulgated by the International Law
Commission.109 By codifying rape and sexual violence and enumerating
the elements of these crimes, and through its status as a “widely endorsed
multilateral treaty—[the ICC] can be taken to signify customary
international law with respect to sexual violence as a war crime and crime
against humanity,” and satisfy the prongs of the first test of jus cogens.110
Thus, the reasons for the initial necessity for the ICC and the uniform
definition of rape and sexual violence have largely remained the same and
continue to be necessary even a decade after the Court’s formation.
B. THE PROSECUTOR V. GERMAIN KATANGA AND MATHIEU NGUDJOLO
CHUI
The Democratic Republic of Congo ratified the Rome Statute in April
2002.111 In March 2004, the DRC government referred the situation on its
territory since the Rome Statute’s entry into force in July 2002.112 The
Prosecutor initiated an investigation in June 2004.113 In July 2007, the Pre105. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2166 (XXI) (May 23, 1969), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/
vclt.html.
106. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 231–232.
107. Sellers, supra note 73, at 296.
108. Sellers, supra note 73, at 296.
109. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 232.
110. Mitchell, supra note 103, at 232. For a further discussion of the second prong of the
jus cogens test and the status of rape as a norm of jus cogens, see supra.
111. Case Information Sheet, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/ PIDS/publications/KatangaChuiEng.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for Katanga and Ngudjolo and
issued a decision in March 2008 joining the cases based on “alleged coresponsibility for the crimes allegedly committed during and in the
aftermath” of the attack.114 The charges were confirmed in September
2008.115 Trial Chamber II then granted 366 victims the right to participate
in the proceedings, represented by the Legal Representatives of the
Victims.116 The trial commenced on November 24, 2009.117
1.

The Factual Backdrop to Katanga and Ngudjolo

The atrocities at Bogoro were committed as part of a wider
international armed conflict arising out of Congo’s deep and difficult
history of exploitation and greed by outsiders. In 1871, Henry Morton
Stanley, a Welsh journalist for the New York Herald, traveled to Africa,
where he found the “lost” Scottish missionary Dr. David Livingstone, as
well as the vast natural resources of ivory and, most importantly, rubber.118
Upon his return to Europe, Stanley became the private emissary for King
Leopold II of Belgium who laid personal claim to all of Congo.119 Leopold
was eventually forced to sell his claim to Belgium, which continued to
administer Congo as a colony and exploit its natural resources until
1960.120
Soon afterwards, the CIA assassinated Congo’s first
democratically elected leader, Patrice Lumumba, and Joseph Desiré
Mobutu, a U.S. ally, became the leader of the newly renamed Zaire.121
Zaire continued to be quietly ruled and exploited by Mobutu and his
western allies for more than thirty years until, in 1994, the entire world
became aware of the civil wars and genocide in the neighboring Rwanda
and Burundi.122 Zaire was the natural haven for the defeated Rwandan
Hutus, who fled through the mountains and brought with them “an attitude
cultivated by Hutu Power propaganda that as a matter of ethnic pride and
political policy, Tutsi women must be raped.”123 The Rwandan Hutu
introduced the concept of rape to Mobutu’s regime and the numerous

114. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111; Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chiu, Case
No. ICC-01/04-02/07, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chiu, 6 (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc460177
.pdf.
115. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111.
116. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111.
117. Case Information Sheet, supra note 111.
118. Ann Jones, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Rape, in WAR IS NOT OVER WHEN
IT’S OVER 131, 131–132 (2010).
119. Id. at 131.
120. Id. at 132–33.
121. Id. at 133.
122. Id. at 134.
123. Id. For an overview of the Hutu-Tutsi history and the Rwandan genocide, see
generally Alexandra A. Miller, Comment, From the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda to the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to
Include Rape, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349 (2003).
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guerilla factions keen on overthrowing the ailing kleptocrat.124 But the
Hutus also continued their war on the refugee Tutsi population in Zaire,
and the various factions and governments in the region, for one reason or
another, aligned themselves with either side. This resulted in what became
known as “Africa’s World War,” and eventually involved eight African
nations and about twenty-five armed groups.125 In 1996, Laurent Kabila, a
longtime Congolese rebel, gained the support of anti-Mobutu Zaire’s Tutsi
and was able to overthrow Mobutu in what became officially known as the
First Congo War.126 Kabila then turned on the Tutsis and their allies who
helped him attain power in the Second Congo War whilst he continued
exploiting Congo’s resources for personal gain and while his armies
continued raping for pleasure, need, and degradation.127 In 2006, after the
2003 peace accords that in reality failed to stop the fighting and raping in
eastern Congo, Joseph Kabila succeeded his assassinated father in an
election aimed at merely covering up the instability in the region.128
2.

The Katanga and Ngudjolo Decisions

Nearly four years after the start of the trial, Trial Chamber II issued a
decision severing the charges against Katanga and Ngudjolo due to a “legal
recharacterisation [sic]” of “the mode of liability under which Germain
Katanga stands charged.”129 On December 18, 2012, the Chamber
acquitted Ngudjolo finding that it was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the commander of the Lendu combatants at the time of
the Bogoro attack.130 Importantly, the judges did state, “that this did not
signify that crimes had not been committed,” and “recognised [sic] that
Ngudjolo was a chief commander of the FNI,” in March 2003, after the
February attack.131 Njudgolo was released from custody on December 21,

124. Jones, supra note 118, at 134.
125. Lee Ann De Reus, My Name is Mwamaroyi: Stories of Suffering, Survival, and Hope
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in RAPE: WEAPON OF WAR AND GENOCIDE 139, 144
(Carol Rittner & John K. Roth eds., 2012).
126. Jones, supra note 118, at 134–35.
127. Jones, supra note 118, at 135.
128. Jones, supra note 118, at 136. Kabila succeeded his father in 2001, but was formally
elected in 2006. See supra.
129. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07, Decision on the implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and
severing charges against the accused persons, § III (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529337.pdf.
130. Press Release, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, First Acquittal by the ICC
(Dec. 18, 2012) http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Ngudjolo-Press-Release--final.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf.
131. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute.
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2012.132 The Office of the Prosecutor has appealed the decision.133
Judgment in the Katanga case is pending.

VI. APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES TO KATANGA
The Katanga case serves as the first-ever opportunity for the ICC to
apply the revolutionary rules it has codified since the Court’s inception
over a decade ago. However, it is necessary to mention that this lack of
attention on behalf of the Court toward rape and sexual violence is not due
to a lack of situations and test cases—the ICC is currently investigating
eighteen cases in eight separate situations.134 Eleven of the cases include
charges for rape, sexual violence, and sexual enslavement, three of which,
not including Katanga and Ngudjolo, stem from the situation in DRC.135
But Katanga is the only currently pending case with the opportunity to
finally apply the codified rules arising out of the ICTY and ICTR and
create a prosecutorial standard for future use. And although, as mentioned
above, forced marriage was not charged under “any other form of sexual
violence” or “other inhumane acts,” as it has been at the SCSL, the ICC
may still seize sua sponte the opportunity to address and develop its
jurisprudence on this matter in this case.136
Over the course of the trial, numerous male and female witnesses have
testified as to the gender-based crimes occurring during the Bogoro attack,
in the subsequent days, and as general practice of the two armed groups.137
Three female witnesses testified specifically to rape—they were gangraped by soldiers, and on multiple occasions, brought to a prison camp and
sexually enslaved as “wives.”138 Male witnesses testified that women were
abducted, taken hostage, used as sexual slaves, and forced into marriage

132. Democratic Republic of Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/relate
d%20cases/ICC-01-04-02-12/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
133. Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Prosecution’s
Appeal against Trial Chamber II’s “Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut”
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1531064.pdf.
134. Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
135. Democratic Republic of Congo, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/Pages
/situation%20index.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
136. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g), (e).
137. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card on International
Criminal Court 2011, 226 (Nov. 2011), http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/GenderReport-Card-on-the-International-Criminal-Court-2011.pdf [hereinafter Gender Report
Card 2011].
138. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 165–75. The ICC, in this instance,
utilized the application of the word “wife” to show ownership of the victim as opposed to
the perpetrator’s intent to force a conjugal association with the victim, as the AFRC Appeals
Chamber did, infra VII.
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with Ngudjolo’s knowledge and implicit permission.139 A witness also
testified to a system of mutilating men and women that was used during the
attack in Bogoro, which included cutting off sexual organs as well as heads
and opening the victim’s chest.140 However, neither Katanga nor Ngudjolo
were charged with mutilation. Although these practices were disputed as
“contrary to the use of the [battle] rituals,” extensive witness testimony
supports the allegations that these atrocities were nevertheless
committed.141
Under both Article 7(1)(g)-1 and Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, crimes against
humanity and war crimes respectively, elements of rape are:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of
the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment,
or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving
genuine consent.142
This definition is reflective of the spirit of both the ICTR Akayesu and
the ICTY Furundžija decisions as the definition is narrow and explicit
enough to establish stable grounds for prosecution but also encompasses
the broad spirit of Akayesu and allows for flexibility in prosecutorial and
judicial discretion. Furthermore, the coercive element is also fairly broad
and is meant to support the Akayesu court’s supposition that “coercion may
be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict,” meaning that
once the existence of an armed conflict is established, rape and sexual
violence occurring within that conflict is assumed to be nonconsensual.143
Furthermore, it is required that the rape, as a crime against humanity, was
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population” and “[t]he perpetrator knew . . . or intended” it as
such.144 As a war crime “[t]he conduct [must have taken] place in the
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict” and
“[t]he perpetrator was aware” of such.145 These requirements also apply to

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 226–27.
Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 227.
Gender Report Card 2011, supra note 137, at 227.
Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688.
Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-1.
Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1.
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the war crime and crime against humanity of sexual slavery.146 The
Elements of Crimes expand on the Kunarac decision by specifically
enumerating sexual slavery as a crime under war crimes and crimes against
humanity; the Elements define sexual slavery as “[exercising] any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons,
such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” and
“[causing] such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual
nature.”147 The Elements of Crimes also specifically enumerate sexual
violence as a crime against humanity and a war crime, a step in the right
direction for independent recognition of gender-based crimes that neither
the ICTY nor the ICTR took.148
In applying the Elements of Crimes to the Bogoro incident and
Katanga, Trial Chamber II will have to decide whether the crimes were
committed as part of a widespread or a systematic attack, whether Katanga
knew or intended it as such, and whether the attack took place in the
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict, and
whether Katanga was aware of that. Based on the country conditions at the
time of the attack and the widespread conflict between the Hema and the
Lendu, as well as the participation of numerous neighboring countries in
the conflict, it is likely that both of the conditions will be met.149 Then, the
Court will have to conduct a highly fact-specific finding based on witness
testimony, as to whether Katanga was present at the Bogoro attack and
whether his actions, based on the applicable mode of liability, rise to the
conduct enumerated in the Elements. As the record has been redacted
extensively for the purpose of witness protection and the cases are highly
fact-based, it is difficult to conclude with certainty whether Katanga’s
conduct will give rise to a guilty verdict. However, it is likely, given
available testimony that the evidence of rape and sexual slavery during and
subsequent to the attack at Bogoro will be sufficient and extensive enough
to find for a guilty verdict. Whether the Trial Chamber will choose to
address the issue of forced marriage, under the umbrella of one of the
crimes already charged, is uncertain but there is sufficient evidence in the
record to allow such a diversion from the original indictment.

VII. FORCED MARRIAGE
It is important to note that the Trial Chamber does not have the
opportunity of addressing separately the issue of forced marriage. Since
the Rome Statute does not have jurisdiction over the independent crime of
146. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
147. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
148. Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, art. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6.
149. Trial Background, The Trial of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
http://www.katangatrial.org/trial-background (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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forced marriage under either crimes against humanity or war crimes, as
neither the ICTR nor the ICTY had, and the Office of the Prosecutor chose
not to charge the crime under either “other form[s] of sexual violence” or
“other inhumane acts,”150 forced marriage was not charged in the
indictment against either Katanga or Ngudjolo. In fact, the only modern
tribunal that has thus far actively prosecuted and independently addressed
the issue of forced marriage is the SCSL.151 In 2008, the Appeals Chamber
recognized forced marriage as a distinct crime falling under “other
inhumane acts,” as part of crimes against humanity.152 This lack of legal
attention to forced marriage is not due to the absence of the issue as both
the cases at ICTR encountered extensive testimony regarding the forced
taking of “wives”153 and the ICC’s investigation and prosecution in the
DRC situation established the prevalence of the practice.154 Rather, the
hesitance to prosecute forced marriage during a conflict (as opposed to
arranged marriages occurring in the peace time—an important
distinction155) arises out of the debate whether explicitly enumerating
forced marriage as a crime against humanity would diminish the gravity of
the crime by limiting it to a domestic distinction or if such action would
instead internationally recognize the specific crime the victims endured.156
In the case of Katanga, the lack of recognition of forced marriage as a
separate crime against humanity likely does not diminish the seriousness of
the prosecution and of the recognition of atrocities committed against the
women and girls at Bogoro and in the Ituri region such that the benefit in
adoption by the ICC of the standards SCSL has used in its crucial forced
marriage cases, discussed infra, would outweigh the muddling of the

150. Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 7(1)(g), (e).
151. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has also begun
conducting investigations into forced marriage during the Khmer Rouge regime. See
Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith & Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/19-092007-ECCC-OCIJ, Order on Request for Investigative Action Concerning Forced Marriages
and Forced Sexual Relations (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Dec. 18,
2009), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D268_2_EN.pdf.
152. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 202
(Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6xjuPVYy%2fvM%3
d&tabid=173 [hereinafter AFRC Appeals Judgment].
153. Monika Satya Kalra, Forced Marriage: Rwanda’s Secret Revealed, 7 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 201 (2001).
154. Gender Report Card 2010, supra note 1, at 171, 174; Eva Smets, Justice for “Bush
Wives”: The ICC and Bosco Ntaganda, HUFF. POST (May 31, 2012, 10:25 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-smets/justice-for-bush-wives-congo_b_1534000.html;
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 353 (Int’l Crim. Court Pre-Trial Chamber I (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf.
155. See Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against
Humanity?, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 53, 34 (2009).
156. Compare Valerie Oosterveld, The Gender Jurisprudence of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: Progress in the Revolutionary United Front Judgments, 44 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 49, 67 (2011) with Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 3.
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distinction in the elements between forced marriage and sexual slavery.
However, this fear of muddling of the elements does not mean that the ICC
should avoid addressing the issue altogether. At the very least, in finding
Katanga guilty of sexual slavery, the Court could identify the specific
aspects of forced marriage that also constitute sexual slavery, discuss any
potential differences it recognizes in the practices, and acknowledge that
such practices have been prevalent in the conflict.
The SCSL developed its forced marriage jurisprudence in two notable
cases—Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, also known as the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) trial, and Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Kallon and Gbao, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) case.
Both cases arose out of the severe sexual violence atrocities committed
during the decade long civil war between various guerilla factions, often
supported by neighboring countries, where as many as 257,000 women and
girls were subject to brutal sexual violence.157
The perpetrators
indiscriminately gang raped, sexually mutilated and tortured, abducted,
sexually enslaved, and forcibly “married” women and girls as young as
ten.158
In June 2007, the SCSL Trial Chamber II handed down the judgment in
the AFRC trial concluding that forced marriage failed to qualify as “other
inhumane acts” under the SCSL Statute due to a lack of “need to create a
new, distinct category of crime,” and finding that the crime of forced
marriage was wholly subsumed by the crime against humanity of sexual
slavery.159 In fact, elements of sexual slavery include exercising “any or all
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons,
such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty,” and
causing “such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual
nature” during the conflict.160 Sufficient testimonial evidence supports the
conclusion that specifically these actions occurred under the
characterization of marriage.161 The prosecutor argued that a crime against
157. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE
SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A), 25–26 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.
hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0103.pdf (citing PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE: A POPULATION BASED ASSESSMENT 3–4
(2002), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/ documents/reports/sexualviolence-sierra-leone.pdf) [hereinafter WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY]. For an in-depth
background discussion of the conflict, see supra at 9–15; see also Gong-Gershowitz, supra
note 155, at 6–10.
158. WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY, supra note 156, at 28–45.
159. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Trial Chamber II
Judgment, ¶¶ 703, 711 (June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=EqikfVSpLWM=&tabid=106 [hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgment]; Statute of the Special
Court of Sierra Leone, art. 2(i) (Jan. 16, 2002), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
160. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 708.
161. See generally AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶¶ 1080–1188.
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humanity of forced marriage should be based around the intention by the
perpetrator to “confer a status of marriage by force or threat of force or
coercion . . . with the intention of conferring the status of marriage,”162 such
that “a declarative act alone, if intended to ‘confer a status of marriage,’
would constitute a violation of international criminal law.”163 But simply
using the term “wife” would not satisfy the gravity element adopted by the
Trial Chamber and such a definition of the crime of forced marriage would
have to imply acts in addition to those intended to confer marital status.164
To address this issue, the prosecutor argued that forced marriage possesses
distinctive features, other than sex, that warrant a separate definition and
recognition from sexual slavery, namely conjugal duties such as cooking
and cleaning.165 However, the Trial Chamber notably rejected cooking and
cleaning as essential characterizations of marriage and instead considered
those acts further evidence of forced labor thus proving the element of
control, as was found in the Kunarac decision in ICTY, and similar to the
use of the word “wife” to demonstrate intent “to exercise ownership over
the victim.”166
The Appeals Chamber, in handing down its verdict in February 2008,
agreed with the prosecution’s argument that forced marriage is not only a
sexual crime but that the perpetrators intended to impose a “forced conjugal
association rather than exercise an ownership interest” in the women and
girls.167 The Appeals Chamber then enumerated distinguishing factors
differentiating forced marriage and sexual slavery: 1) “perpetrator
compelling a person by force or threat of force . . . into a forced conjugal
association with a [sic] another person resulting in great suffering, or
serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim,” thereby 2)
“[implying] a relationship of exclusivity between the husband168 and wife,
which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive

162. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 701.
163. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 22.
164. The Trial Chamber adopted additional elements from the Element of Crimes of the
Rome Statute under “other inhumane acts” including that the “act was of a gravity similar to
the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to (h) of the [SCSL] statute.” AFRC Trial Judgment,
supra note 159, ¶ 698.
165. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 701.
166. AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 159, ¶ 711. The Trail Chamber also held that
“other inhumane acts” did not include crimes of sexual nature since Article 2(g) of the
SCSL Statute already contained the catchall provision of “any other form of sexual
violence.” SCSL Statute, supra note 159.
167. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶¶ 189–90.
168. The term “husband” is certainly not used in this note in the traditional sense to
connote a consensual marital relationship but only for the sake of simplicity in the
discussion. Both the AFRC Appeals Chamber and the RUF Trial Chamber noted the
explicit lack of consent in testimonial evidence. See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note
152, ¶ 190; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶¶
1185, 1211–12, 1287, 1293 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/ LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
D5HojR8FZS4%3d&tabid=215 [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment].
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arrangement.”169 In attempting to establish the gravity of forced marriage
as a stand-alone crime against humanity, the Appeals Chamber relied on
the very same evidence that it had rejected earlier as unnecessary elements
to forced marriage—evidence of physical and sexual violence—in finding
that this conduct on behalf of the perpetrator was grave enough considering
“the atmosphere of violence in which the victims were abducted.”170 The
Appeals Chamber also relied on the notion of exclusivity to differentiate
between sexual slavery and forced marriage even though exclusivity may
also serve as evidence of ownership over the victim supporting the crime of
sexual slavery.171 Even though the Appeals Chamber attempted to provide
a basis for providing a new definition for the crime of forced marriage, the
result created confusion as to what elements constitute the crime and what
weight should evidence of sexual violence be given, as well as when should
it be considered. The Chamber seemed to support the conclusion that
whether the crime at hand is one of sexual slavery or forced marriage
turned on the use of the word “wife” and the intent of the perpetrator to
impose a forced conjugal association. Regardless of its findings, however,
the Appeals Chamber declined to enter fresh convictions on this count.172
The Trial Chamber in the RUF trial was the first to be able to apply the
confusing jurisprudence stemming from the ARFC case in February 2009
when it found three former members of the RUF “guilty of two separate
crimes against humanity, sexual slavery and another inhumane act, based
on a pattern of conduct that the Trial Chamber broadly characterized as
forced marriage.”173 The Trial Chamber, as did the ARFC Appeals
Chamber, used evidence of sexual violence to support findings of both
sexual slavery and forced marriage thus further clouding the distinction
between the two crimes without setting our specific elements defining the
latter.174 Instead, the Trial Chamber explained its understanding of forced
marriage through specifically enumerated instances: forced into conjugal
relationships with RUF soldiers, expected to have sexual intercourse175 on
demand and maintain an exclusive sexual relationship, forced to perform

169. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 195.
170. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶¶ 200–01.
171. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 195.
172. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 202.
173. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted); RUF
Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1293.
174. RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1293–94.
175. The Trial Chamber differentiates through its language the sexual violence committed
against the victims into before and after their “marriages.” In recalling the testimony of
witness TF1-314, the Chamber states “that she was raped twice before being married” and
“[a]s the Commander’s wife . . . was forced to . . . have sexual intercourse with him.” RUF
Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶ 1460 (internal quotations marks omitted). The difference
in language may be the Chamber’s attempt to highlight the apparent nonsexual nature of
forced marriage, as the AFRC Appeals Chamber decided, and the obviously sexual nature of
sexual slavery thus attempting to clarify the difference in crimes.
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domestic chores such as cooking and housework, made to carry the
husband’s possessions, bear children, and completely acquiesce to the will
of her husband.176 These specific instances, however, may be and have
been interpreted by the Trial Chambers as fulfilling the elements of both
sexual slavery and forced marriage, using “the term ‘wife’ [to] either
demonstrate the ‘exclusivity’ factor required for forced marriage or to
demonstrate the ownership factor required for sexual slavery.”177
The ARFC Appeals Chamber finding of a distinct crime against
humanity of forced marriage and the RUF Trial Chamber178 applying the
definition of forced marriage in its trial is a significant step in legally
recognizing and addressing the prevalent issue of forced marriage in an
international court of law. However, the confusing repackaging of the
same facts to prove similar elements of both crimes may in fact be more
harmful in the goal of recognizing and prosecuting forced marriage, which
more often is better described as “sexual slavery plus” and could be better
used as “evidence of aggravating circumstances warranting an additional
penalty during the sentencing phase.”179 Although the ARFC Appeals
Chamber may have been attempting to do for forced marriage what the
Kunarac decision did for sexual slavery—namely bring it to the forefront
of international prosecution and establish it as a recognized peremptory
norm—the definition set forth may have actually set back international
criminal prosecution by muddling the distinctions between the two crimes
against humanity. Instead of trying to enumerate specific elements of
forced marriage under “other inhumane acts” and having to provide
evidence of sufficient gravity, it would be better for the ICC, in developing
its own forced marriage jurisprudence, to accept the sexually based nature
of forced marriage and explicitly recognize it as a particular form of sexual
slavery. In doing so, the victims would be internationally recognized and
vindicated for the especially egregious crime they were forced to
experience instead of being hurriedly lumped together in an ambiguously
defined and overlapping category. By focusing on the conjugal duties,
such as cooking and cleaning, and deeming forced marriage a nonsexual
crime, the ARFC Appeals Chamber directs the focus away from the
physical and sexual violence committed in the conflict and experienced by
the victims while the RUF Trial Chamber’s change in language from

176. RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 168, ¶¶ 460, 1154–55, 1211–13, 1293, 1295, 1413,
1460, 1472.
177. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 62.
178. Both the prosecution and the defendants appealed the Trial Chamber’s verdict on
various grounds and the Appeals Chamber dismissed and amended certain counts of the
indictment but it upheld the counts of sexual slavery and forced marriage, relevant to the
purposes of this note. See generally Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No.
SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=CGgV JRfNF7M%3d&tabid=218.
179. Gong-Gershowitz, supra note 155, at 65.
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“rape” to “sexual intercourse” diminishes and normalizes the extreme
sexual violence experienced by the “wives,” neither of which aids in
recognition and destigmatization of the victims. Specifically recognizing
forced marriage as a crime under sexual slavery would allow for the
specific act to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the
application of the term “wife” not being central to the finding of guilt on a
particular count but as an aggravating factor used in sentencing once the
general crime of sexual slavery has been found and as evidence of the
intent to dominate or control. In handing down the verdict in Katanga, the
ICC could seize upon the opportunity of introducing the crime of forced
marriage into the Court’s jurisdiction and discussion.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Utilizing the Katanga case as the ICC’s first-ever trial study for
prosecuting rape and sexual slavery under the finally codified rules arising
out of the extensive work at the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC will be able to
establish prosecutorial and judicial procedures for prosecuting similar cases
in the near future. Such procedures will not only be useful for the eleven
upcoming rape, sexual violence, and sexual slavery trials, but also in
meeting the original need that led to the inclusion of these definitions and
rules in the ICC in the first place: the creation of a reliable and coherent
jurisprudence, one that would eventually homogenize prosecution of grave
international crimes, including sexual violence crimes. This case is
multifunctional: by employing these rules and definitions in an actual case,
the ICC is demonstrating that an internationally accepted definition of rape
and sexual violence is still necessary and pertinent; by revolutionizing
victim participation, the ICC is calling greater attention to the needs and
well-being of the victims, who undeniably benefit from a solid, universal
legal definition for the crimes committed against them—And by
acknowledging the prevalence of rape and sexual violence in international
and non-international armed conflicts, and enumerating the specific crimes
and their elements, the ICC is endorsing the recognition of rape and sexual
violence as independent jus cogens norms. Additionally, the Katanga case
may also be a suitable platform for the ICC to integrate and develop further
the SCSL jurisprudence on forced marriage even though the crime was not
initially charged in the indictment since sufficient testimonial evidence has
been presented to prove the existence of such practices. If not, the ICC
should continue to monitor the progression of prosecution of forced
marriage through the SCSL and the ECCC tribunals and attempt to develop
its own forced marriage jurisprudence, which would recognize the sexual
nature of forced marriage and enumerate it as a particular crime under
sexual slavery. Such work by the ICC would enable the development of a
uniform definition and application of forced marriage thus recognizing the
atrocities the victims have experienced, similar to the vindication the
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victims are allowed now through the recognition and standardization of
rape, sexual violence, and sexual slavery under the Rome Statute. While
the establishment of these rules reinforces the international cooperation of
States and helps further develop the relatively new field of international
criminal law, these rules will ideally eventually fall into disuse, as rape and
sexual violence would become unthinkable violations of jus cogens norms.
Likewise, the validation of the victims’ experiences and recognition of the
atrocities by the international community, especially by States where these
atrocities are being committed and where the culture continues to blame the
victims, will hopefully assist in the eventual disuse of these rules as well.
In the meantime, the codification of the ICTY and ICTR principles
continues to play a crucial role in the prosecution of rape, sexual slavery,
and sexual violence at the international criminal level.
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